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Abstract: The U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, Marine Corps, and Navy have deployed several hundred port patrol
vessels to protect waterways, U.S. Navy ships and other high-value assets in ports world-wide. Each vessel has an armed crew
of four, is relatively fast, and features a surface search radar, radios, and a machine gun. These vessels coordinate surveillance
patrols in groups of two or four. We developed a mathematical model for advantageously positioning these vessels, and possibly
shore-based radar too, to minimize the probability that an intelligent adversary in one or more speedboats will evade detection while
mounting an attack. Attackers can use elevated obstructions to evade radar detection in their attack paths, and ports feature many
such restrictions to navigation and observation. A key, but realistic assumption complicates planning: the attackers will be aware
of defensive positions and capabilities in advance of mounting their attack. The defender-attacker optimization suggests plans here
for a fictitious port, the port of Hong Kong, and the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain. In these cases, the defender
can almost certainly detect any attack, even though the attacker, observing defender prepositioning, plans clever, and evasive attack
tracks. Published 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.† Naval Research Logistics 58: 223–235, 2011
Keywords: Port security; optimization; attacker-defender
“And thence discover how with most advantage
They may vex us with shot, or with assault.”
Shakespeare, KingHenryVI.
1. INTRODUCTION
We introduce a new planning tool for locating shore radars
and mobile picket boats with radar to maximize the probabil-
ity that one or more speedboat attackers will be discovered
before reaching any of a set of high-value defended assets,
such as anchored or pier-side U.S. Navy ships, commercial
container ships, oil tankers, or liquefied natural gas carri-
ers. The distinguishing contribution here is that this planning
tool explicitly recognizes that the attackers can be expected
to have prior knowledge of defensive disposition, either from
shore observers, satellite imagery, or on-board radar threat
detectors: the attackers will observe defensive preparations
and plan their attacks accordingly. There is no other such
decision-support tool available today for maritime domain
awareness.
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Standard radar equations provide detection predictions, but
our model can accommodate any alternative means of assess-
ing the probability of detection. Representation of restrictions
to navigation, such as shoreline, islands, and breakwaters,
follow planner-specified fidelity; these obstructions may also
obscure defender radars, so line-of-sight precalculation deter-
mines whether an attacker can be detected from any defender
position.
Maritime port security is a newly sharpened focus for the
United States (U.S.) Congress, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and the U.S. Navy (USN). The U.S. deems
maritime security a “vital national interest” [1]. Current mar-
itime threats vary from the possible hijacking of a commercial
vessel to the ramming of an explosive-packed small boat into
a ship, as happened with the USS Cole in the port of Yemen
in 2000 [2] (see Fig. 1).
Protecting high-value assets in a port can be difficult. Mar-
itime ports are “sprawling, easily accessible by water and
land, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and interwoven
with complex transportation networks” [1]. Such ports are
highly susceptible to enemies seekingmultiple “high impact”
objectives to attack. The Al-Qaida terrorist organization has
demonstrated the desire and capability of carrying out such
an attack [4].
One recent example of a major maritime threat was the
Sea Tigers, a maritime detachment of the Liberation Tigers
Published 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. †This article is a US Gov-
ernment work and, as such, is in the public domain in the United
States of America.
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Figure 1. USS Cole after the 2000 attack in Port of Yemen that
killed 17 sailors [3].
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE, a rebel organization in
Sri Lanka, has fought for its independence since 1976. Its
members demonstrate very sophisticated tactics in attacking
Sri Lankan Naval and commercial ships. Their first suicide
boat attack was in 1990. In 1994, they managed to sink a Sri
Lankan Navy warship. Their methods range from utilizing
multiple boats (see Fig. 2) simultaneously to the employ-
ment of distracting fire from shore to mount a coordinated
attack. They continue to pose a significant threat and have
carried out attacks as recently as May 2006 [3].
We anticipate a determined adversary who plans to infil-
trate a maritime port for an attack. We seek a systematic way
to assign defensive radar-equipped ships “pickets,” and pos-
sibly shore-based radar, to detect and alarm such an attack,
even though such defensive preparations will be visible to the
attacker. Optimal placement of sensor platforms will mini-
mize the probability of a successful attack. For our purposes,
a first, single successful enemy infiltration is the signal event
to prevent. Subsequent to such a first event, interdicted or
not, port defenseswould change qualitatively (e.g., withmore
restrictive access rules, more patrol boats, etc.).
The world economy is dependent on maritime commerce,
which is involved in ∼ 80% of world trade [1]. Today there
are 30 mega-ports worldwide, which almost all cargo ships
pass through in the intricate global trade network [5]. A
disruption, called a Transportation Security Incident in our
vernacular, in any one of these mega-ports, even for a short
time, could have a devastating impact on the flow of goods
and oil throughout the world. Standard protocol for respond-
ing to such an incident is an immediate shutdown of all port
operations, followed by a systematic investigation of damage
and any remaining threat to ensure restoration of safety and
security, and finally gradual restoration of operations with
heavy security oversight. Any transportation security inci-
dent at a port will disrupt port operations, perhaps for a long
time.
National Security Presidential Directive 41 [6] establishes
policy and guidelines for all U.S. agencies and stakeholders
inmaritime security, and it also defines the now-core [7]Navy
mission of Maritime Domain Awareness as the “effective
understanding of anything associated with global maritime
domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or
environment of the United States.”
The economic impact of a single attack on one mega-
port leading to degradation of throughput or even a complete
port closure could be dire. For example, the ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach account for ∼40% of all cargo con-
tainer traffic entering the U.S. [8]. The longshoremen strike
of 2002 lasted for just ten days, but cost the U.S. economy
an estimated $20 billion [9].
Agencies responsible for maritime security include the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection [10], the Transporta-
tion Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S.
Navy. DHS has funded a combined total of $3.8 billion for
these activities during fiscal years 2006–2008 alone [11]. The
burden of overall port security falls on the U.S. Coast Guard
[12], which is procuring up to 700 SAFE Boats’ “Defender”
class patrol boats (referred to hereafter as SAFE patrol boats)
to provide maritime security [13]. At the same time, the U.S.
Navy has expanded some operational focus from deep ocean
to littoral (i.e., coastal) waters as well. The Navy has reestab-
lished its riverine forces and equipped them with SAFE-like
Small Unit Riverine Craft. Both agencies are extending ties
with international allies to enhance global maritime domain
awareness [31].
Coast Guard Port Security Units operate in two postures
depending on the threat level and manning: either with four
boats on duty allowing two boats to be on station at all
times, or with six boats on duty and four boats always on
station. The two boats not on station act as a standby pair or
Figure 2. Archival image of a high-speed boat from a training
video captured from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
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Figure 3. Sample network representationwith square cells of con-
stantwidth, each identified by a row and a column index.An attacker
can traverse from any cell via an arc to any adjacent cell.
as a shuttle boat and a boat set aside for a 24-hour main-
tenance period. Patrol durations vary from 4 to 6 hours.
The specific placement of boats is left to the judgment of
the Tactical Action Officer, who reports to the Commanding
Officer [14]. Employment and tactics depend heavily on the
personal experience of these officers.
Defense of ports has improved substantively over the past
6 years. However, disposition of defenders is planned on
a perceived-threat basis, and emphasis has been on thwart-
ing an attack by assuming the potential attacker can observe
the defensive patrol boats and may be dissuaded simply by
their presence. These visible defensive positions can also be
refined to gain maximal surveillance advantage.
1.1. Prior Literature
Weapply bi-levelmixed integer linear programming (MIP)
to position our radar systems and then predict how an intelli-
gent attacker would respond, given these defensive positions
are visible. Bard and Moore [15] introduce a heuristic to
solve a bi-level MIP. Wood [16] develops a defender-attacker
maximum flow network interdiction model that maximally
reduces the resulting network capacity using a limited num-
ber of defensive resources to eliminate arcs in a network,
and which has applications to impeding drug trafficking net-
works. Israeli and Wood [17] describe an attacker-defender
shortest-path network interdiction problem and formulate it
using a bi-level MIP, introducing efficient decomposition
techniques to solve such a problem. Brown et al. [18] develop
attacker-defender, defender-attacker, and defender-attacker-
defender (tri-level) optimization models for the defense of
critical infrastructure. They apply these models to many real-
world examples, such as the Strategic PetroleumReserve, the
U.S. Border Patrol at Yuma, AZ, and electrical transmission
systems, in order to highlight vulnerabilities, and to advise
the allocation of defensive resources.
1.2. Our Problem
We anticipate a determined, intelligent attacker will try to
reach fixed high-value targets in a large port where U.S. Navy
ships or other high-value ships are anchored or pier-side. We
consider a single successful undetected attack as a failure for
the defender. We assume transparency in our model in that
the enemy can view our defensive prepositioning and react
accordingly to avoid detection.
In our scenarios the attacker utilizes a number of small
speedboats similar to a 20-foot Baja Outlaw Class, which
can hold up to six people, and can travel at up to about 54
knots (nm/hr) [19]. The defender employs SAFEpatrol boats,
which have a crew of four, can carry up to 10 people, and
travel at up to 46 kts. SAFE patrol boats can be equipped
with a 12.7mm machine gun with an effective range of 1500
meters [20]. The defender also has shore radar installations
that help detect any attacker.
There are no strict paths or routes over water, so we rep-
resent our maritime environment using a mesh network. We
break down the surface into square cells of a given width.
Each cell is connected by an arc to and from every adjacent
cell (horizontal, vertical, or diagonal) unless we specify an
obstruction to navigation (see Figs. 3 and 4). The attacker can
traverse any arc between adjacent cells to reach a goal cell.
Each defender platform is assigned a cell (node) to occupy,
from which he will surveil as much maritime domain as
possible.
Table 1 shows how we estimate the probability of evasion,
Pe(s, t), as defined in (P9), for an attacker transiting a given
cell, t , and a defender searching from another given cell, s,
Figure 4. Sample network representation with cells and obstruc-
tions. Black cells represent obstructions to navigation. Cells (i02,
j02) and (i03, j03) are not adjacent. Assuming these black cells not
only block navigation but also contain obstacles whose height above
the water is sufficient to obstruct observation, then a defender in the
North-West cell (iOl, jOl), for instance, cannot detect an attacker
in the South-East cell (i05, j05), nor any of the grey cells (if any
portion of a cell is obscured by an intermediate obstruction, we
conservatively assume the entire cell is obscured).
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Table 1. Derivation of evasion probability by an attacker located
at cell t = (it , jt) from a defender at s = (is, js), assuming no inter-
vening obstruction to observation. The coordinates in (PI) and (P2)
are expressed in the same terms as those in Figures 3 and 4.
s = (is, js) Defender cell (P1)
t = (it , jt) Attacker cell (P2)
cell_width Cell side distance (P3)
v Defender velocity (P4)
rm Maximum radar range (P5)
sr Searcher sweep rate (P6)
x = cell_width∗√(it − is)2 + (jt − js)2 (P7)
Pd(s, t) = 1 − exp
(




Pe(s, t) = exp
(




assuming there is no intervening obstruction to observation.
The defender pays a penalty for travelling faster in the form
of a decreased detection probability. The function in (P8)
models area search (see, e.g., Ref. 21, p.173).
We assume the intelligent attacker will want to maximize
his probability of evasion by traversing a path, PATH, of
contiguous cells t ∈ PATH, that has the maximum joint
probability of evading detection while transiting all of the
cells in the path. This is a conservative estimate of his capa-
bilities to observe our defensive positions and navigate to
avoid them. Assuming that multiple defenders will detect an
attacker independently of each other, the overall probability
of the attacker evading detection in any cell t is the product
of the evasion probabilities,
∏
s Pe(s, t), where the product
is taken over all cells s occupied by defenders. Assuming
cell-to-cell independence, (specifically, that failure to detect
an attacker early on does not influence the probability of
detection later in the attacker’s path), the overall joint prob-
ability that the attacker will evade detection on his path is
then the product of the evasion probabilities of each cell tra-
versed, Pe = ∏t∈PATH∏s Pe(s, t). We take the logarithm of
this expression to render a summation of logs of probabilities,
and note that maximizing the sum of these logs is equivalent
to maximizing the product of the probabilities. In our models
wewill allow for defenders of varying capabilities (i.e., sweep
widths, maximum range), and we will derive the appropriate
log-probabilities as coefficients for linear objective functions.
Our simple radar equation can be replaced by one with much
higher fidelity, [e.g., [22]], but for purposes of our exposition
this only changes exogenous data, andmakes no difference to
the structure or complexity of the mathematical optimization
models.
For each pair of cells s and t in the operating region, we
determine which cells are encountered along a straight line-
of-sight between s and t . If any such intervening cell contains
an obstacle that is high enough above the waterline (taking
into account whether the object floats, the current tide height,
and curvature of the earth) to obscure that line of sight, a ship
in cell t cannot be observed by a ship in cell s.
2. MODEL FORMULATION
2.1. The Attacker
The attacker has a set of speedboats a ∈ A that can each
choose to enter a network at any of a number of entry cells
c ∈ E, traverse a set of cell-to-cell arcs d ∈ D to reach and
exit the network at any of a number of goal cells c ∈ Gwhere
defended assets are located. Each arc admits a limited number
of speedboat traversals arc_cap. Traversing each arc carries
a risk of detection the attacker cannot control, based on the
(fixed) positions of searchers. We refer to the fixed searcher
positions by the exogenous data vector Xˆ, where Xˆs = 1 if
cell s is occupied by a searcher, and is zero otherwise. For an
arc d that emanates from cell c1 and terminates at cell c2, we
could calculate the log probability of evasion on that arc to
be the same as the log probability of evasion in cell c1. The
overall path log probability of evasion would then be the sum
of the cell log probabilities of evasion along the path, omit-
ting the term for the final cell. We choose a slightly different
approach, in which we calculate each arc log probability of
evasion based on the probabilities of evasion in both the start
cell and end cell of the arc. The log probability that an attacker
will evade detection while traversing arc d is then:














where we assume the attacker spends half of his time on arc
d in each of those adjacent cells. This formula, when used
to calculate the log probability of evasion for the entire path,
assumes the attacker starts in the middle of his entry cell and
ends his path at the center of his goal cell. Each intermediate
cell on the path appears twice, once for the inbound arc, and
once for the outbound arc, hence the 1/2 coefficients in (P10).
The attacker seeks one attack path per speedboat that max-
imizes the sum of the log probabilities of evading detection
along that path.
We express the attackers’ planning problemwith themodel
AMAX(êvX):
2.1.1. Indexes and index sets [∼cardinality]
a ∈ A attacker [∼5]
i ∈ I horizontal discrete cell coordinate [∼30]
j ∈ J vertical cell coordinate [∼30]
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c ∈ C cells, each with horizontal coordinate ic,
and vertical coordinate jc (alias c1, c2)
[∼1000]
c ∈ E ⊆ C cells where an attacker can enter the
network [∼100]
c ∈ G ⊆ C goal cells with defended assets [∼10]
d ∈ Dc1,c2 = D cell adjacencies, or traversal arcs (e.g.,
given cell c, d ∈ Dc,c2 includes every
out-arc from cell c to an adjacent cell c2)
[∼8000]
2.1.2. Data [units]
arc_cap maximum attackers allowed to traverse any arc
[attackers]
êvXd log of probability that an attacker will evade
detection traversing arc d [log likelihood]
2.1.3. Variables [units]
ENTERc number of attackers entering network at entry
cell c [attackers]
Yd number of attackers traversing arc d [attackers]
GOALc number of attackers exiting network at goal cell
c [attackers]






















GOALc ≤ −|A| [δ] (A3)
0 ≤ ENTERc ∀c ∈ E (A4)
0 ≤ Yd ≤ arc_cap ∀d ∈ A [γd] (A5)
0 ≤ GOALc ∀c ∈ G (A6)
2.1.5. Discussion
The attacker’s objective (A0) is to maximize the total joint
probability that attacker boats evade detection over all the
arcs they choose to traverse, through maximizing the sum of
the logs of individual successful arc traversal probabilities.
Constraint (A1) limits the number of entries into the network
via entry cells, each constraint (A2) forces conservation of
flow at a cell in the network, and constraint (A3) limits the
number of exits from the network via goal cells. Stipulations
(A4–A6) bound the decision variables. (A5) limits the num-
ber of attackers transiting any cell, a limit that can be used
to force attack path diversity. If the data in (A1), (A3), and
(A5) are integral, this linear program is equivalent to a short-
est path problem in a network, and will therefore produce
an intrinsically integral solution Y*, ENTER*, and GOAL*.
For simplicity, we refer to such a solution in the following as
simply Y*.
2.2. The Defender
The defender controls a set of surveillance platforms (e.g.,
patrol boats, shore radar installations, etc.) p ∈ P that may
each be located at a set of cells s ∈ Cp to surveil arcs in the
network. The log probability that an attacker traversing arc
d will evade detection by defender boat p located in cell s
is evd,p,s. The defender seeks positions for his surveillance
platforms collectively to minimize the sum of the log proba-
bilities of attackers evading his surveillance. We express the
defender’s problem DMIN(Yˆ) as follows:
2.2.1. New indices and index sets [∼cardinality]
p ∈ P defending platforms [∼4]
s ∈ Cp ⊆ C cells where a defending platform p can be
located [∼250]
2.2.2. New data [units]
evd,p,s log probability that an attacker traversing arc d =
(c1, c2) would evade detection by defender p in
position s [log probability]
evd,p,s ≡ 1/2 log(Pe(s, c1)) + 1/2 log(Pe(s, c2))Yˆd
number of attackers traversing arc d [attackers]
2.2.3. Variables [units]
Xp,s 1 if platform p located in cell s, 0 otherwise [binary]
Z total log likelihood of evading detection [log proba-
bility]
2.2.4. Formulation










Xp,s ≤ 1 ∀p ∈ P (D2)
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∑
p∈P |s∈Cp
Xp,s ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ C (D3)
Xp,s ∈ {0, 1} ∀p ∈ P , s ∈ Cp
(D4)
2.2.5. Discussion
Together, (D0) and (D1) define an objective function that is
the minimum upper bound on the sum of the log probabilities
of evasion. Each constraint (D2) requires a defender platform
to be located in just one cell, each constraint (D3) allows any
cell to be occupied by at most one defender, and (D4) stipu-
lates a binary location decision for each defender. We formu-
late (D0) and (D1) in this way to set up our decomposition
algorithm, which follows.
2.3. Defender-Attacker Model
We now consider a realistic case, and a worrisome one.
The defender wishes to optimize defensive pre-positioning
of surveillance platforms while assuming the attacker will
observe these preparations and optimize attacks to exploit
any weakness in these defenses. The defender’s objective is
to minimize the maximum probability of evasion by attack-
ers. We note that this model is a conservative one for the
defender because he must protect against the worst possible
set of attacks, and it therefore yields a sequential decision
problem in which the defender must place ships or other
sensors before the attacker chooses his minimum-risk path.
This is a zero-sum Stackelberg game [23] (i.e., a
sequential-play game with perfect information). Using nota-





























GOALc ≤ −|A| [δ] (A3)
0 ≤ ENTERc ∀c ∈ E (A4)
0 ≤ Yd ≤ arc_cap ∀d ∈ A [γd ] (A5)







Xp,s ≤ 1 ∀p ∈ P (D2)
∑
p∈P |s∈Cp
Xp,s ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ C (D3)
Xp,s ∈ {0, 1} ∀p ∈ P , s ∈ Cp (D4)
The opponents share the objective (AD0), while the con-
straints (D2–D4) govern defender preparations, and (A2–A6)
limit the attacker courses of action. The objective coefficient
evd,p,s is the logarithm of the probability of evasion given
cell d is traversed by an attacker when defender platform p is
located in cell s. The square brackets emphasize the sequen-
tial nature of these decisions: first, the defender (the leader)
decideswhere to place observers, next the attacker (follower),
observing these placements, decides how to attack to mini-
mize the probability of detection. The attacker problem inside
the square brackets is a linear program when X is fixed, and
the Greek notation defines dual variables for the constraints.










s.t. (A1)−(A6) and (D1)−(D4)
We cannot solve MINMAX with conventional techniques,
but if we temporarily fix variables Z and X, the result is a
capacitated minimum cost network flow problem. Taking the
dual of this linear program, and freeing Z and X, (See [16]
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for a proof of the correctness of this basic reformulation tech-
nique) we achieve an integer linear program SAFE-ILP we









s.t. α − βc ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ E (T1)





evd,p,sXp,s ∀d ∈ Dc1,c2 (T2)
βc−δ ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ G (T3)∑
s∈Cp
Xp,s ≤ 1 ∀p ∈ P (T4)
∑
p∈P |s∈Cp
Xp,s ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ C (T5)
α ≥ 0
βc ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C
γ ≥ 0
δd ≥ 0 ∀d ∈ D
Xp,s ∈ {0, 1} ∀p ∈ P , s ∈ Cp (T6)
2.3.1. Discussion
This reformulation uses the variables introduced as duals
for the constraints in AMAX(êvX).
The optimal solution to the defender-attacker model
SAFE_ILP positions seen defender platforms, recovering
the corresponding attack plans by solvingAMAX(êvX)with
variables X fixed at their optimal values Xˆ, and êvXd,p,s =
evd,p,sXˆp,s .
2.4. Decomposition
SAFE_ILP can be (very) hard to solve at large scale.
Accordingly, we have decomposed the SAFE optimization
as follows [24]. We modify DMIN(Yˆ), replacing equation
(D1) with a set of constraints (D1D).
2.4.1. New index
k ∈ K decomposition iteration
2.4.2. New Data
Yˆ k attacker plans for iteration k
DMIND(Yˆ) formulation
Zmin(Yˆ ) = min
Z,X
Z (D0)






d Xp,s k = 1, . . . ,K (D1D),
and constraints (D2)–(D4).
The complete decomposition algorithm is as follows:
2.5. Algorithm MINMAX
Input: Data for defense problem, optimality tolerance ε ≥ 0;
Output: ε-optimal SAFE location plan X∗, and responding
attacker plan Y∗;
1. Initialize best upper boundZUB ← ∞, best lower bound
ZLB ← −∞, define the incumbent, null SAFE plan
X∗ ← Xˆ1 ← 0 as the best found so far, and set iteration
counter K ← 1;
2. Subproblem: Using êvXd,p,s = evd,p,sXˆkp,s, solve sub-
problem AMAX(êvX) to determine the optimal attack
plan YˆK given XˆK ; the bound on the associated objective
is Zmax(XˆK);
3. If K = 1 and YˆK is not an admissible solution, Goto
step (6) (Master Problem)
4. If (ZUB > Zmax(XˆK)) set ZUB ← Zmax(XˆK) and
record improved incumbent SAFE plan X∗ ← XˆK , and
responding attacker plan Y∗ ← YˆK ;
5. If (ZUB − ZLB ≤ ε) go to End;
6. Master Problem: Given attack plans Yˆk , k = 1, . . . K ,
attempt to solve master problem DMIN(Yˆ) to deter-
mine an optimal defender plan XˆK+1. The bound on the
objective is Zmin(Yˆ);
7. If ZLB < Zmin(Yˆ) set ZLB ← Zmin(Yˆ);
8. If (ZUB − ZLB ≤ ε) go to End;
9. Set K ← K + 1 and go to step (2) (Subproblem);
10. End: Print “X∗ is an ε-optimal SAFE solution, and Y∗
is the attacker response to that plan,” and halt.
For the sake of efficiency, one need not store incumbent
attacker plans Y∗ in step 4. These can be recovered after-
the-fact by computing êvXd,p,s = evd ,p,sX∗p,s and solving
AMAX(êvX).
The advantage here is that the decomposition isolates a
large sub-problem that is a minimum cost network flow prob-
lem from the much smaller, and simpler integer linear pro-
gram master problem to locate platforms. The former prob-
lem can be solved very quickly with a specialized network
simplex algorithm (e.g., [25]), and the latter can be solved
with a local search heuristic. This offers the opportunity
to write a customized solver in any available programming
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Figure 5. Aerial image of Mina Salman - Bahrain US 5th Fleet Headquarters [27] which oversees defense of the freedom of sea commerce
in the Persian Gulf. The horizontal latitude parallels are separated by 18 arc seconds, or about 0.3NM (556 meters).
language without need for procuring a licensedmathematical
modeling language or commercial optimization solver.
3. SAMPLE PLANNING PROBLEMS
We illustrate with the U.S. Fifth Fleet Headquarters,
Bahrain, a generic test problem for experimentation, and the
Port of Hong Kong.
We are dealing with small, fast attack boats, and we want a
high-resolution network to represent theirmaneuvers.We use
a cell width of 0.15 nautical miles (NM) (about 278 meters).
The surveillance problems we state fit within a 30 verti-
cal by 35 horizontal cell array, or maritime domains about
4.5NM by 5.3NM, for a total surveillance area of about
24NM2. The SAFE defenders cruise at 35 knots, the radar
sweep rate is 0.8 revolutions per minute with a maximum
range of 36NM, and the SAFE boats cannot locate closer
than one nautical mile away from any defended asset, and do
not customarily venture more than 10 NM from their home
base.
We include obstruction masking of defender radars, with
line-of-sight calculations to determine exactly which cells
can be seen by a defender boat in any particular defensive
position. To develop experiments completely reproducible
from this paper alone, we have endowed every obstruction
here with sufficient elevation to obscure any incident ray. In
reality, there may bemany low obstructions that limit observ-
ability only for certain tide heights. The obstruction masking
elicits real-world terrorist behavior to hide and evade detec-
tion. Our custom FORTRAN ray tracing routine to perform
these line-of-sight calculations is only invoked when some
change to obstructions is sensed, and takes a couple of min-
utes to revise tables of cell-to-cell observability using formula
(H1) or (H2), as appropriate.
For each planning problem, we have evaluated all combi-
nation of from one to four attacker boats versus either two or
four defender boats.
In our experience, the GAMS modeling language and
CPLEX 11 solver [26] generate and solve a problem instance
via decomposition in about a minute. Some instances of
SAFE-ILP cannot be solved as a single monolithic model,
but the decomposition converges to a zero optimality tol-
erance (i.e., solves the problem optimally) in somewhere
between 5 and 15 iterations. Even for cases where the ILP
monolith is directly solvable, the decomposition is much
faster to generate and solve.
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Figure 6. Bahrain instance with a single attacker and two SAFE Defender boats. The defended goal cells “G” are (i20,j09) and (i21,j08).
The SAFE defender boats are based at cells “H” at cells (il6,j06) and (il7,j06). Obstacle boundaries are shown with “[#]”, and land-mass with
“[X]”. The attacker can enter via any cell on the threat axis labeled “E” at the northwest and southeast corners. Defender boats cannot locate
within one nautical mile of any goal cell, or their alarm would be of little use, and “.” indicates where they can locate. Here, the defenders are
located at (i16,j15) and (i17,j15). These positions offer advantaged unobstructed surveillance of both north-west and south-east threat axes, as
well as the defended goal cells. The lone attacker enters at (i01,j11) and, while knowing defender positions, hugs the shoreline to maximize
probability of evasion to attack goal cell (i20,j09). The attacker probability of evasion is near zero.
4. U.S. NAVCENT FIFTH FLEET – BAHRAIN
Bahrain’s port Mina Salman is strategically positioned in
the Persian Gulf, and hosts US Fifth Fleet Headquarters, but
its approaches are very constrained for deep-draft vessels,
with only one main channel for commercial shipping enter-
ing from the southeast. See Fig. 5 for satellite imagery of
the port. However, there are two other approaches that small
boats can use to enter the port area.
We took this image of Mina Salman and manually dis-
cretized it into square regions by graphically overlaying a
grid, and then using our own judgment as to whether each
cell in this grid was navigable, or was an obstruction. We
then chose goal cells as locations for a hypothetical target,
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Figure 7. Generic instance with two SAFE Defender boats and two attackers that can enter from any cell “E” from the southeast. The
defended assets are located at northwest goal cells “G” (i01,j01) and (i02,j02), and defender boats must locate at least one nautical mile from
these in candidate positions labeled “.”. Defender boats, denoted by “P,” must also be located within 10NM of their home cells, marked “H,”
but this restriction is vacuous in this scenario. The defenders position at (i27,j01) and (i01,j26), and the two attackers “A” and “B,” knowing
where we are pre-positioned, spread out to use obstructions “[#]” to evade detection. Note how the defender positions maximize the coverage
of attacker transit cells, and minimize obscuration by obstructions.
and specified entry cells on the left side of the top boundary
and along the edges of the bottom-right corner.We used equa-
tions (P1)–(P9) to determineprobabilities of evasion concern-
ing each pair of navigable locations on this map, and then
formulated and solved the max–min formulation using Ben-
ders decomposition, implemented in GAMS, using CPLEX
as the solver. In Fig. 6 we provide some of the output gen-
erated by our solver for this specific instance, including an
ASCII map of the scenario displaying all relevant features,
including the optimal placement of the defender boats and the
resulting attacker’s optimal path. We have added color to this
display to clarify some of the output. At the bottom of this
display, we can see that our decomposition algorithm con-
verged to a provable optimal solution, with no gap between
the upper and lower bounds.
5. GENERIC SURVEILLANCE PLANNING
PROBLEM
In order to appreciate the size of the optimization prob-
lems we are solving, we provide a generic instance in which
we posit a geographically simple maritime port (see Fig. 7)
with three islands (obstacles) between the attacker entry cells
(along the bottom-right corner) and the goal target cells (in the
top-left corner). For two attackers and two defenders, SAFE-
ILP has 8640 constraints, 10,611 variables (1952 binary) and
14,943,881 nonzero coefficients. CPLEX 11 cannot solve
this; the enumeration tree runs out of space even with 2GB of
randomaccessmemory available.UsingBenders decomposi-
tion, each sub-problem has 1021 constraints, 7662 variables,
and 22,961 coefficients, while the last (14th) restrictedmaster
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Figure 8. Satellite image of the port of Hong Kong [27]; Hong Kong is one of the three largest ports in the world, handling in 2008 about 22
million 20-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) of container cargo worth ∼$24 thousand each, or about a half trillion dollars [29,30]. The horizontal
lines are latitude parallels, separated by eight arc seconds, which is ∼0.133NM, or just under 250 meters.
problem has 992 constraints, 1953 variables (1952 binary),
and 31,246 coefficients. We satisfy an optimality tolerance of
zero and achieve essentially a 100% probability of detection
over any inbound attacker path in about a minute.
6. PORT OF HONG KONG
The port of Hong Kong is one of the busiest in the world.
We anticipate attacker entries from anywhere west-to-south.
See Fig. 8. In the decomposition, each sub-problem has 952
constraints, 6651 variables, and 19,984 coefficients, while the
last (fifth) restrictedmaster problemhas 834 constraints, 1657
variables (1656 binary), and 9940 coefficients. See Fig. 9. In
the optimal solution, the two defenders are positioned in adja-
cent cells, each of which has visibility of almost every cell
along any reasonable path approaching the goal. Other poten-
tial defender cells are either not able to “see” the approach
from the west, [roughly, cells (i01,j01) to (i12,j03)], or lose
visibility of the goal cells themselves.
7. CONCLUSION
We introduce a bi-level defender-attacker integer linear
program to advise optimal prepositioning of defender surveil-
lance pickets in amaritime domain tominimize themaximum
probability that intelligent attackers, observing our surveil-
lance positions, can evade us with multiple attacking boats
and reach any one of a set of a high-value targets.
In every instance we examine, alert defenders with exist-
ing radar can detect attacker raids with near 100% probability
using optimal prepositioning. This is due, in part, to the
restricted navigational access channels to ports: these are bot-
tlenecks that offer effective defense postures against attacker
speedboats. Still, our optimization sometimes suggests sur-
veillance positions far from the bottlenecks, the better to
detect stealthy, evading attackers.
These models advise optimal defender positions (i.e,
“cells”), but do not dictate that each defender must main-
tain a fixed position at all times. The prescriptions are for
maximally-advantaged positions, and themodels can be used
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Figure 9. Port of Hong Kong instance with two SAFE Defender boats and two attackers. Attackers can enter from any cell “E” west or
south. Defended asset goal cells “G” are (i08,j20) and (i09,j20). Optimal positions for defenders “P” are cells (i25,j05) and (i26,j05). One
optimal attacker “A” enters from the northwest, and the other “B” from the southeast. It turns out these two cells offer superior surveillance
of the entire port, including restricted passages.
to evaluate the returns from alternative positions. And, for
instance, obstacle heights and tides (complicating details
accommodated here, but not used in our simplified numerical
examples) make a difference.
Abduhl-Ghaffar [28] includes more instances for these
cases, as well as for the Port of Los Angeles and the Al Basra
Oil Terminal (ABOT) in Iraq. He considers cases with one
to four attackers and either two or four defenders and also
considers coordination of more powerful shore-based radars
in tandem with the SAFE boats afloat.
In the real world, exceptional conditions such as stormy
sea state may complicate our planning, and (fortunately) that
of our adversary. Suffice it to say, if we can evaluate the
probability that any surveillance platform, in any environ-
mental state, can detect an attacking one, we can optimize
our pre-positioning as well or better than anyone with less
knowledge.
While detection is desirable, early detection is preferable.
We can easily weight our objective function to move our sur-
veillance forward to press for early detection, perhaps at the
expense of overall detection. For example, if we multiply
each evd,p,s by (1 + dgsθ), where dgs is the distance, in nm,
from cell s to the nearest goal cell, and θ ≥ 0 is a single scalar
controlling our defensive posture, then setting θ = 1 in our
test scenario moves the defenders forward, to cells (i30, j08)
and (i01, j26), respectively.
The interested reader can reproduce each of our experi-
ments from the data shown in this paper.
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